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The Legacy of John Paul II to Lawyers 
John F. Coverdale∗
Only a small fraction of John Paul II’s voluminous writings 
directly address legal issues, but he has left lawyers an extraordinarily 
rich and challenging legacy.  He offers us an  alternative vision to the 
prevailing positivist and postmodern views. 
For John Paul II, the law is not an isolated technical discipline 
unmoored from a larger system of morality.  Rather, it is an 
instrument in our search for the human fulfillment that is the goal of 
morality.  As such, it necessarily reflects a set of moral aspirations.  
For John Paul II, it is not enough that a legal system be technically 
coherent and conducive to civil peace and economic prosperity.  
Ultimately, laws are to be fashioned and judged on the basis of their 
ability to contribute to the flourishing of the community and of each 
of its members.  That flourishing requires civic peace and economic 
prosperity, but goes beyond them to encompass the full human 
development of the members of the society and, ultimately, their 
relationship with God.  In this context, John Paul II appreciates the 
values inherent in democracy and free-market economies,  but treats 
them not as self-justifying ultimate values but as instruments to be 
used in our efforts to build societies that will facilitate the search for 
truth and goodness. 
John Paul II challenges both the Marxist collectivist vision of law 
and society and the individualistic liberal vision that dominates the 
thinking of American lawyers and legal academics.  Although he takes 
on specific issues like the right to property and its role in society,  his 
basic challenge to both collectivism and individualism lies at the level 
of philosophical and theological anthropology.  In opposition to both 
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collectivism and individualism, he offers a set of distinctive answers to 
the ultimate questions that any lawyer who is concerned about the 
underpinnings of the law must ask: Of what does human fulfillment 
consist?  What is the basis of human dignity?  What is the relationship 
between truth and freedom?  What forms the foundation of human 
rights? 
John Paul II’s vision is deeply rooted in his religious faith.  He is 
convinced that Christ “fully reveals man to himself and brings to light 
his most high calling.”1  In his view, ultimate human fulfillment is to 
be found in a relationship with God who embodies the truth and 
goodness we seek.  This does not mean, however, that John Paul II’s 
thought is of interest only to those who share his religious faith.  Even 
a cursory search of the World Wide Web demonstrates that many 
people whose world view is not religious have found that his thought 
challenges and enriches their own positions with new perspectives.  
Many who reject his religious beliefs find that John Paul II’s 
description of the human condition resonates with their own 
experience and aspirations. 
The appeal of John Paul II’s thought to those outside his 
religious tradition lies in the fact that he convincingly engages the 
human experience of his readers.  In addition to being a believer and 
a theologian, John Paul II is an original philosopher whose 
phenomenological analysis of human experience lays bare many 
profound truths about human action and life.2  His analysis of the 
philosophical wellsprings of human activity and freedom, as well as of 
Christ’s teaching and example, enables him to propose values that 
ring true to many men and women of other religions or of no 
religion. 
John Paul II’s thought derives its power not only from its 
intellectual rigor and coherence with the reader’s personal 
experience but from a life based on the convictions formulated in his 
writings.  The John Paul II who wrote about the contribution of work 
to human fulfillment spoke not merely from the quiet of a scholar’s 
library or the glare of a world leader’s podium, but from a quarry 
where, as a laborer during the Nazi occupation of Poland, he felt 
 1 Encyclical Letter from Pope John Paul II to the Bishops of the Catholic 
Church, Redemptor Hominis [On the Redeemer of Man] ¶ 8 (Mar. 4, 1979), 
available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documen 
ts/hf_jp-ii_enc_04031979_redemptor-hominis_en.html [hereinafter Redemptor 
Hominis] (emphasis omitted). 
 2 See ROCCO BUTTIGLIONE, KAROL WOJTYLA: THE THOUGHT OF THE MAN WHO 
BECAME POPE JOHN PAUL II (1997). 
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“bone-chilled and exhausted most of the time.”3  His meditations on 
the role and positive value of suffering in human life gained 
immeasurably in strength and attraction as he lived them out in the 
long years of his physical decline and the weeks of his last illness and 
death. 
In addition to his own example, John Paul II backed his theories 
with the example of more than 1700 people whom he either 
canonized (named “Saint”) or beatified (named “Blessed”).4  Many of 
them were lay men and women of the twentieth century.  Their lives 
reflected, often in striking fashion, the values John Paul II expressed 
in his writings.  Their real-life experiences give John Paul II’s thought 
a power and attraction that mere speculation, however erudite, lacks. 
This Article offers an introduction to some aspects of John Paul 
II’s thought.  It is directed primarily to readers who have little or no 
knowledge of his writings, but who do have an interest in 
jurisprudence and in the broader issues of the law.  Although I have 
not always resisted the temptation to offer readers in footnote some 
suggestions for further reading, my focus is on John Paul II’s own 
writings rather than on the abundant literature they have provoked.  
Wherever possible, I have tried to let him speak in his own words, 
without excessive commentary or paraphrasing on my part.  My goal 
is to present his thought rather than critiquing it or examining in 
depth its implications, applications, and limitations. 
Part I of this Article focuses on issues of philosophical and 
theological anthropology, and on the ultimate questions about what 
it means to be human.  Although the questions are philosophical and 
theological rather than legal, some set of answers to them ultimately 
underlies every coherent legal system. Part II of this Article examines 
John Paul II’s approach to specific issues that are directly related to 
the legal system. 
I. PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 
A. The Value and Dignity of Persons 
John Paul II has often been described as a “personalist” because 
of his emphasis on the value and dignity of the human person. 5  
“[M]an is the only creature on earth that God willed for itself,” he 
 3 TAD SZULC, POPE JOHN PAUL II: THE BIOGRAPHY 116 (1995). 
 4 Saint Watch, U.S. CATHOLIC, July 2004, at 11. 
 5 See, e.g., KENNETH L. SCHMITZ, AT THE CENTER OF THE HUMAN DRAMA: THE 
PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY OF KAROL WOJTYLA/POPE JOHN PAUL II 35–36 (1993). 
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asserts over and over again, quoting the Second Vatican Council’s 
constitution Gaudium et Spes.6  “[I]n Christ and through Christ,” he 
says, “man has acquired full awareness of his dignity, of the heights to 
which he is raised, of the surpassing worth of his own humanity, and 
of the meaning of his existence.”7  That dignity and worth belong not 
to “the ‘abstract’ man, but the real, ‘concrete,’ ‘historical’ man . . . in 
his unique unrepeatable human reality.”8
In his thought, the person is the central focus, and the policies 
of any community should ultimately be directed to the full 
development of each of the persons who comprise it, whether that 
community be a country, a village, a business, a club, or a family.  
Communities of all sorts exist to serve persons.  Whatever a 
community’s specific objective (from promoting world peace to 
selling pencils), the ultimate justification of its existence is the service 
it provides to persons. 
The most fundamental and inviolable dignity and worth of each 
person derives from personhood, from being a person, “a subjective 
being capable of acting in a planned and rational way, capable of 
deciding about himself, and with a tendency to self-realization.”9  
Human dignity rests on being created in “the image and likeness of 
God,”10 endowed on the natural level with an intellect and will11 that 
 6 See, e.g., Redemptor Hominis, supra note 1, ¶ 13 (quoting Second Vatican 
Council, Gaudium et Spes [Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern 
World] ¶ 22 (Dec. 7, 1965), available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_ 
councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_cons_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.h 
tml [hereinafter Gaudium et Spes]).  For a discussion of John Paul II’s vision of human 
dignity, see John F. Coughlin, O.F.M, Pope John Paul II and the Dignity of the Human 
Being, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65 (2003). 
 7 Redemptor Hominis, supra note 1, ¶ 11. 
 8 Id. ¶ 13. 
 9 Encyclical Letter from Pope John Paul II to the Bishops of the Catholic 
Church, Laborem Exercens [On Human Work] ¶ 6 (Sept. 14, 1981), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_en 
c_14091981_laborem-exercens_en.html [hereinafter Laborem Exercens]. 
 10 See, e.g., Redemptor Hominis, supra note 1, ¶ 13 (quoting Genesis 1:26). 
 11 See Pope John Paul II, Address To Participants in the International Conference 
Sponsored by the Pontifical Council for Pastoral Assistance to Health-Care Workers: 
In The Image and Likeness of God: Always?  Illness of the Human Mind ¶ 3 (Nov.  
30, 1996), available at http://www.ewtn.com/library/PAPALDOC/JP96N30.htm 
[hereinafter Address to Health-Care Workers]. 
Philosophical and theological reflection has identified in man’s mental 
faculties, that is, in his reason and in his will, a privileged sign of this 
affinity with God.  These faculties, in fact, enable man to know the 
Lord and to establish a relationship of dialogue with him.  In 
discussing this, St. Thomas points out, “Person signifies what is most 
perfect in all nature, that is, a subsistent individual of a rational 
nature.” 
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makes human beings capable of entering into loving relationships 
with others and of making a “sincere gift of self” to others.12  Over 
and above this natural dignity, every human being is “called to a 
fullness of life which far exceeds the dimensions of his earthly 
existence, because it consists in sharing the very life of God.”13
This fundamental dignity and worth is independent of talents or 
accomplishments.  So, for example, John Paul II insists that even a 
person suffering from serious mental illness, which may obstruct 
normal use of the faculties that reflect most directly man’s likeness to 
God, nonetheless “‘always’ bears God’s image and likeness in himself, 
as does every human being.  In addition, he ‘always’ has the 
Id. (quoting ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE I, Q. 29, art. 3). 
It should be made clear however that the whole man, not just his 
spiritual soul, including his intelligence and free will, but also his body 
shares in the dignity of “the image of God.”  In fact, the human body 
“is a human body precisely because it is animated by a spiritual soul, 
and it is the whole human person that is intended to become, in the 
body of Christ, a temple of the Spirit.”  “Do you not known [sic][,”] the 
Apostle writes[,] “that your bodies are members of Christ[ . . . ]?  You 
are not your own. . . .  So glorify God in your body.”  Hence the need to 
respect one’s own body, and also the body of every other person, 
especially the suffering. 
Id. (internal citations omitted) (quoting Catechism of the Catholic Church § 364, 
available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p1s2c1p6 
.htm; 1 Corinthians 6:15, 19–20; Catechism of the Catholic Church § 1004, available at 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/catechism/p123a11.htm).  See also Apostolic Letter of 
Pope John Paul II, Mulieris Dignitatem [On the Dignity and Vocation of Women]  
¶ 7 (Aug. 15, 1988), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/ap 
ost_letters/documents/hf_jp-ii_apl_15081988_mulieris-dignitatem_en.html 
[hereinafter Mulieris Dignitatem] (“By reflecting on the whole account found in 
[Genesis] 2:18–25, and by interpreting it in light of the truth about the image and 
likeness of God, we can understand even more fully what constitutes the personal character 
of the human being, thanks to which both man and woman are like God.  For every 
individual is made in the image of God, insofar as he or she is a rational and free 
creature capable of knowing God and loving him.” (internal citation omitted) (citing 
Genesis 1:26–27)). 
 12 Letter from Pope John Paul II to Families ¶ 12 (Feb. 2, 1994), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/letters/documents/hf_jp-ii_let_02 
021994_families_en.html [hereinafter Letter to Families].  See Mulieris Dignitatem, 
supra note 11, ¶ 7 (“Moreover, we read that man cannot exist ‘alone’; he can exist 
only as a ‘unity of the two,’ and therefore in relation to another human person.  It is a 
question here of a mutual relationship: man to woman and woman to man.  Being a 
person in the image and likeness of God thus also involves existing in a relationship, 
in relation to the other ‘I.’  This is a prelude to the definitive self-revelation of the 
Triune God: a living unity in the communion of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit.” 
(internal citation omitted) (citing Genesis 2:18)). 
 13 Encyclical Letter from Pope John Paul II to the Bishops of the Catholic 
Church, Evangelium Vitae [The Gospel of Life] ¶ 2 (Mar. 25, 1995), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_en 
c_25031995_evangelium-vitae_en.html [hereinafter Evangelium Vitae]. 
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inalienable right not only to be considered as an image of God and 
therefore as a person, but also to be treated as such.”14
John Paul II’s stress on the dignity of each person precludes 
“using” human beings to achieve the goals of the society as Marxist 
and other totalitarian regimes would do.15  Rather, in his view, the 
function of the state is to promote “the common good,” understood 
not as the aggregate of the goods of a majority of individuals, but 
rather as the “sum of social conditions which permit and foster in 
human beings the integral development of their person.”16  Rather 
 14 Address to Health-Care Workers, supra note 11, ¶ 8.  Going to an even more 
extreme case, that of persons in a persistent vegetative state, John Paul II affirms: 
[T]he intrinsic value and personal dignity of every human being do not 
change, no matter what the concrete circumstances of his or her life.  A 
man, even if seriously ill or disabled in the exercise of his highest functions, is 
and always will be a man, and he will never become a ‘vegetable’ or an 
‘animal.’  Even our brothers and sisters who find themselves in the 
clinical condition of a ‘vegetative state’ retain their human dignity in 
all its fullness. 
Pope John Paul II, Address to the Participants in the International Congress on Life-
Sustaining Treatments And Vegetative State: Scientific Advances And Ethical 
Dilemmas ¶ 3 (Mar. 20, 2004), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john 
_paul_ii/speeches/2004/march/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_20040320_congress-fiamc_ 
en.html [hereinafter Address on Life-Sustaining Treatments].  See also Pope John Paul II, 
Address to Disabled People and Their Families (Dec. 3, 2000), available at http:// 
www.catholic-forum.com/saints/pope0264lu.htm (calling for “an attitude and a 
culture” of “integration” of the disabled that respects their right to a dignified life 
and to acceptance and autonomy). 
 15 In John Paul II’s view: 
[T]he fundamental error of socialism is anthropological in nature.  
Socialism considers the individual person simply as an element, a 
molecule within the social organism, so that the good of the individual 
is completely subordinated to the functioning of the socio-economic 
mechanism.  Socialism likewise maintains that the good of the 
individual can be realized without reference to his free choice, to the 
unique and exclusive responsibility which he exercises in the face of 
good or evil.  Man is thus reduced to a series of social relationships, 
and the concept of the person as the autonomous subject of moral 
decision disappears, the very subject whose decisions build the social 
order. 
Encyclical Letter from Pope John Paul II to the Bishops of the Catholic Church, 
Centesimus Annus [The Hundredth Year] ¶ 13 (May 1, 1991), available at http:// 
www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_0105 
1991_centesimus-annus_en.html [hereinafter Centesimus Annus]. 
 16 Pope John Paul II, Message for World Day for Peace (Jan. 1, 2005), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/messages/peace/documents/hf_j
p-ii_mes_20041216_xxxviii-world-day-for-peace_en.html.  Although fostering the 
common good is a special responsibility of governments, John Paul II sees all 
members of society as implicated in the effort to create the conditions that permit 
human flourishing.  Addressing artists, for instance, he said: 
Within the vast cultural panorama of each nation, artists have their 
unique place.  Obedient to their inspiration in creating works both 
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than the person existing to serve some higher good, the person is the 
end and goal at whose service the state exists: “the origin, the subject 
and the purpose of all social institutions is and should be the human 
person.”17
B. The Meaning of Self-Realization: The Gift of Self 
Although John Paul II stressed the primacy of persons and 
rejected Marxism and other forms of collectivism, he was far from 
embracing the individualism that characterizes much American 
thought,18 especially in its libertarian strains.19  Individualism sees 
“freedom as the ultimate goal and the individual as the ultimate 
entity in society.”20  It views the individual as self-contained, and the 
worthwhile and beautiful, they not only enrich the cultural heritage of 
each nation and of all humanity, but they also render an exceptional 
social service in favour of the common good. 
Letter from Pope John Paul II to Artists (Apr. 4, 1999), available at http://www. 
vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/letters/documents/hf_jp-ii_let_23041999_artist 
s_en.html. 
 17 Encyclical Letter from Pope John Paul II to the Bishops of the Catholic 
Church, Veritatis Splendor [The Splendor of Truth] ¶ 97 (Aug. 6, 1993), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_en 
c_06081993_veritatis-splendor_en.html [hereinafter Veritatis Splendor] (quoting 
Gaudium et Spes, supra note 6, ¶ 25). 
 18 For a classic study of American individualism, see ROBERT BELLAH, HABITS OF 
THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985). 
 19 One example, albeit an extreme one, of libertarian individualism is the 
“objectivist philosophy” of Ayn Rand, whose novel Atlas Shrugged was listed second 
after the Bible in a 1991 survey conducted for the Library of Congress and the Book 
of the Month Club in which respondents were asked to name a book that had 
changed their lives.  The Library of Congress Center for the Book, Book Lists, 
http://www.loc.gov/loc/cfbook/booklists.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2005).  In 
Rand’s view, the ultimate moral value for each individual is his or her own well-being, 
and selfishness, understood as “concern with one’s own interests,” should be 
considered a virtue.  See AYN RAND, VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS vii (Signet 1961). 
 20 MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 5 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1962), quoted 
in Daniel Rush Finn, The Economic Personalism of John Paul II: Neither Right Nor Left, 2 J. 
MARKETS & MORALITY 79 (1999).  In an essay first published in 1961, the future John 
Paul II laid out succinctly his opposition to both individualism and totalitarianism: 
[P]ersons may easily place their own individual good above the 
common good of the collectivity, attempting to subordinate the 
collectivity to themselves and use it for their individual good.  This is 
the error of individualism, which gave rise to liberalism in modern 
history and to capitalism in economics.  On the other hand, society, in 
aiming at the alleged good of the whole, may attempt to subordinate 
persons to itself in such a way that the true good of persons is excluded 
and they themselves fall prey to the collectivity.  This is the error of 
totalitarianism, which in modern times has borne the worst possible 
fruit. 
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goal of life as pure autonomy: to make one’s own decisions, without 
reference to standards other than one’s own preferences. 
John Paul II rejects this individualistic view.  He does not see the 
individual as self-contained.  His fully-realized human being is not an 
atomistic, isolated individual, but rather a member of communities 
ranging in size from family to country and even to the entire world 
community: 
Each man in all the unrepeatable reality of what he is and what he 
does, of his intellect and will, of his conscience and heart . . . has, 
because he is a “person,” a history of his life that is his own and, 
most important, a history of his soul that is his own. . . . 
[However,] in keeping with the openness of his spirit within and 
also with the many diverse needs of his body and his existence in 
time, [he] writes this personal history of his through numerous 
bonds, contacts, situations, and social structures linking him with 
other men, beginning to do so from the first moment of his 
existence on earth, from the moment of his conception and birth. 
. . . [He lives] in the sphere of society and very diverse contexts,  
in the sphere of his own nation or people (perhaps still only  
that of his clan or tribe), and in the sphere of the whole of 
mankind . . . .21
This could be read as a statement of the obvious fact that all 
human beings need help in meeting their needs and in developing 
their potential.  That would, however, miss John Paul II’s point.  He is 
saying not that we need others for what they can give us—as resources 
for the achievement of our individual goals—but rather that we reach 
our full development only by giving ourselves to others: 
[H]e cannot “fully find himself except through a sincere gift of self.”  
This might appear to be a contradiction, but in fact it is not.  
Instead it is the magnificent paradox of human existence: an 
existence called to serve the truth in love.  Love causes man to find 
fulfilment through the sincere gift of self.22
KAROL WOJTYLA, Thomistic Personalism, in PERSON AND COMMUNITY: SELECTED ESSAYS 
174 (Theresa Sandok trans., 1993). 
 21 Redemptor Hominis, supra note 1, ¶ 14. 
 22 Letter to Families, supra note 12, ¶ 11 (quoting Gaudium et Spes, supra note 6,  
¶ 24).  The concept that human beings find their ultimate fulfillment not by taking 
things for themselves but by making a loving gift of themselves to others is directly 
rooted in Christian revelation and concretely in the doctrine of the Trinity.  See, e.g., 
Mulieris Dignitatem, supra note 11, ¶ 18 (“[T]his description, indeed this definition of 
the person [as finding fulfillment in the sincere gift of self], corresponds to the 
fundamental biblical truth about the creation of the human being—man and 
woman—in the image and likeness of God.”).  Catholic theology sees in the Trinity 
three divine persons who each completely possesses the divine being, which is also 
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John Paul II is fully aware of the human capacity for selfishness 
and lack of concern for others,23 as well as for brutal violations of the 
most elementary human rights.24  He is convinced nonetheless that 
man is by nature capable of transcending self-centeredness and 
orienting himself toward the other.  “Another way of saying this is 
that humans have the capacity to love—that mysterious ability to 
fully possessed by each of the other divine persons. Further, the divine persons are 
defined precisely by their relationship to each other. 
Despite its theological roots, the concept of persons finding fulfillment in giving 
themselves to others can appeal to those who do not accept its religious foundation 
because, as John Paul II notes, it reflects the “truth about man which is confirmed by 
the very experience of humanity.”  Letter to Families, supra note 12, ¶ 6.  For a secular 
psychological argument in favor of seeking fulfillment in the gift of self, see MARTIN 
E.P. SELIGMAN, AUTHENTIC HAPPINESS: USING THE NEW POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY TO 
REALIZE YOUR POTENTIAL FOR LASTING FULFILLMENT (2002) (arguing that the 
“Meaningful Life” consists in using one’s strengths in the service of something much 
larger than self); GREGG EASTERBROOK, THE PROGRESS PARADOX (2003) (observing 
that prosperity has not brought greater happiness and arguing in favor of finding 
meaning in service of greater ideals). 
John Paul II’s own life is a striking example of finding fulfillment in selfless 
service to others.  Millions of people were able to see him and be touched by his 
words and example because, at an age when most men are comfortably retired, he 
continued to travel the world.  To the end of his life, he reached out to people in the 
crowds who came to see him, despite having been shot at as he moved through the 
crowd in St. Peter’s Square in 1981.  Only a few days before his death, although the 
doctors who had performed a throat operation on him weeks earlier advised him 
against speaking, he insisted on trying to address the people who had gathered in St. 
Peter’s Square on Palm Sunday. 
 23 John Paul II’s personal experience of the Nazi occupation of Poland and the 
brutally repressive Communist regime that followed it left no room for a 
Pollyannaish view of human nature.  See, e.g., Pope John Paul II, Address to the 
Diplomatic Corps ¶ 4(Jan. 10, 2005), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/ 
john_paul_ii/speeches/2005/january/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_20050110_diplomati 
c-corps_en.html (“[E]vil takes on the countenance of selfishness and hatred, which is 
negativity; it can only be overcome by love, which has the positivity of generous and 
disinterested giving, even to the point of self-sacrifice.  This is the heart of the 
mystery of Christ’s birth: to save humanity from the selfishness of sin and its corollary 
of death, God himself lovingly enters, in Christ, into the fullness of life, into human 
history, thus raising humanity to the horizon of an even greater life.”). 
 24 See, e.g., Pope John Paul II, Message for the Sixteenth Anniversary of the 
Liberation of the Prisoners of the Auschwitz-Bikernau Death Camp (Jan. 27, 2005), 
available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/messages/pont_mess 
ages/2005/documents/hf_jp-ii_mes_20050127_auschwitz-birkenau_en.html.  (“This 
anniversary calls us to ponder once again the drama which took place there, the 
final, tragic outcome of a programme of hatred.  In these days we must remember 
the millions of persons who, through no fault of their own, were forced to endure 
inhuman suffering and extermination in the gas chambers and ovens.  I bow my 
head before all those who experienced this manifestation of the mysterium iniquitatis 
[mystery of evil].”). 
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desire the good for others, to give of themselves for others, and to go 
out of themselves to seek union of mind and heart with others.”25
All men and women are, of course, capable of turning in on 
themselves and treating others as mere instruments for the 
satisfaction of their needs or whims.  But according to John Paul II, 
far from being a manifestation of human flourishing, focus on self 
prevents human beings from reaching their full potential and the 
happiness that comes with it: 
When man does not recognize in himself and in others the value 
and grandeur of the human person, he effectively deprives 
himself of the possibility of benefitting from his humanity and of 
entering into that relationship of solidarity and communion with 
others for which God created him.  Indeed, it is through the free 
gift of self that man truly finds himself.  This gift is made possible 
by the human person’s essential “capacity for transcendence . . . .”  
A man is alienated if he refuses to transcend himself and to live 
the experience of selfgiving and of the formation of an authentic 
human community oriented towards his final destiny, which is 
God.26
In John Paul II’s view, these considerations are not merely 
guides to personal conduct.  Because they reflect the reality of 
human nature, they should also serve as guides to social organization.  
A society will achieve the common good and facilitate the full human 
development of its members only if its structures reflect and facilitate 
living “in the dimension of gift.”27  On the contrary, “[a] society is 
alienated if its forms of social organization, production and 
consumption make it more difficult to offer this gift of self and to 
establish this solidarity between people.”28
 25 Kristina Johannes, Protecting the Human Environment: Alienation as Social Critique, 
13 RELIGION AND LIBERTY, Mar.–Apr. 2003, at 6.  This understanding of human beings 
as essentially social has deep roots in Catholic thought.  In fact, Thomas Aquinas 
asserts that “[i]t is natural to all men to love each other.”  ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, 
SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES, Bk. III, ch. 117 (Vernon J. Bourke trans., Hanover House 
1956).  Hobbes’ more pessimistic view of human nature, summed up in the famous 
phrase “homo homini lupus,” stands in sharp contrast to the traditional Catholic 
understanding of human nature (even after original sin) and reflects the pessimism 
of many Protestant reformers who were convinced that human nature was totally 
corrupted by original sin. 
 26 Centesimus Annus, supra note 15, ¶ 41. 
 27 For the idea of living “in the dimension of gift,” see Apostolic Letter of Pope 
John Paul II to Youth for the First World Youth Day (Mar. 31, 1985), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_letters/documents/hf_jp-ii_ 
apl_31031985_dilecti-amici_en.html. 
 28 Centesimus Annus, supra note 15, ¶ 41. 
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C. Freedom: The Uncoerced Ability to Know and Embrace Truth 
In addition to offering a view of human nature in which the 
person is the highest value but in which the person is essentially 
social and destined to find its fulfillment in the gift of self to others, 
John Paul II puts forward a vision of freedom that contrasts sharply 
with the individualistic view of freedom that underlies classical 
liberalism, and many other strands of contemporary American 
thought.  In the individualistic vision, freedom consists primarily in 
the absence of external constraints and the consequent ability to 
make one’s own choices without reference to external standards.  In 
the words of one of the leading exponents of the academic version of 
this view, F.A. Hayek: 
The real question, therefore, is not whether man is, or ought to 
be, guided by selfish motives but whether we can allow him to be 
guided in his actions by those immediate consequences which he 
can know and care for or whether he ought to be made to do 
what seems appropriate for somebody else who was supposed to 
possess a fuller comprehension of the significance of these actions 
to society as a whole.29
This concept of freedom as the absence of any external reference in 
deciding about one’s actions is reflected in the Supreme Court’s 
statement in Planned Parenthood v. Casey30 that “[a]t the heart of 
liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of 
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”31
For the individualistic view of freedom as self-initiation, any 
guide external to the individual that could constrain in any way 
individual action would violate the individual’s freedom.32  John Paul 
II offers a sharply different view of freedom.  Freedom, he says, 
“possesses an inherently relational dimension . . . .  [It is placed] at 
the service of the person and of his fulfilment through the gift of self 
and openness to others.”33  Freedom, according to John Paul II, 
 29 Friedrich A. Hayek, Individualism: True and False, in INDIVIDUALISM AND 
ECONOMIC ORDER 14 (1948), quoted in Finn, supra note 20, at 79. 
 30 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 31 Id. at 851.  The sentiment is not confined to judicial opinions or academic 
writings.  Consider Frank Sinatra’s 1968 hit, My Way: “And now, the end is here. / 
And so I face the final curtain. / My friend, I’ll say it clear.  / I’ll state my case, of 
which I’m certain. / I’ve lived a life that’s full. / I traveled each and ev’ry highway. / 
And more, much more than this, I did it my way.”  FRANK SINATRA, MY WAY (Reprise 
Records 1969). 
 32 See Finn, supra note 20, at 79. 
 33 Evangelium Vitae, supra note 13, ¶ 19. 
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consists not in self initiation without reference to specific goals but in 
the ability to choose the true and the good without coercion: 
A person who is concerned solely or primarily with possessing and 
enjoying, who is no longer able to control his instincts and 
passions, or to subordinate them by obedience to the truth, 
cannot be free: obedience to the truth about God and man is the first 
condition of freedom, making it possible for a person to order his 
needs and desires and to choose the means of satisfying them 
according to a correct scale of values . . . .34
Before further exploring this concept of freedom, we need to 
highlight its underlying premises: that there is a truth about God and 
man, and that human beings are capable of knowing it.  In sharp 
contrast to the prevailing skepticism about our ability to know, John 
Paul II vigorously defends human ability to reach truth, not only 
about the physical universe that surrounds us, but more importantly 
about ourselves, and ultimately about God.  “The human person, with 
his reason, is,” he says, “capable of recognizing both this profound 
and objective dignity of his own being, and the ethical requirements 
that derive from it.  In other words, man can discern in himself the value 
and the moral requirements of his own dignity.”35
John Paul II begins his argument in favor of the human ability to 
know truth with Aristotle’s observation that “[a]ll human beings 
desire to know.”36  His argument, however, rests not primarily on the 
authority of ancient philosophers but on common human 
experience, and concretely on the pursuit of truth both in daily life 
and in science:37
Everyday life shows how concerned each of us is to discover for 
ourselves, beyond mere opinions, how things really are . . . .  
People cannot be genuinely indifferent to the question of 
 34 Centesimus Annus, supra note 15, ¶ 41. 
 35 Pope John Paul II, Address to the Participants in the General Assembly of the 
Pontifical Academy for Life ¶ 3 (Feb. 27, 2002), available at http://www.vatican. 
va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/speeches/2002/february/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_200 
20227_pont-acad-life_en.html. 
 36 ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS, I, 1 (Arthur Madigan trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1999) 
(quoted in Encyclical Letter from Pope John Paul II to the Bishops of the Catholic 
Church, Fides et Ratio [Faith and Reason] ¶ 25 (Sept. 14, 1998), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_en 
c_15101998_fides-et-ratio_en.html [hereinafter Fides et Ratio]). 
 37 John Paul II’s style of argument here owes much to the German 
phenomenologist Max Scheler who excelled at describing experiences and values.  
John Paul II wrote his second doctoral dissertation in philosophy on Scheler.  Karol 
Wojtyla, System etyczny Maksa Schelera jako srodek do opracowania etyki chrzescijanskiej [The 
Ethical System of Max Scheler as Means of Constructing a Christian Ethics] (doctoral 
dissertation, Jagiellonian University) (Dec. 1953). 
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whether what they know is true or not.  If they discover that it is 
false, they reject it; but if they can establish its truth, they feel 
themselves rewarded.  It is this that Saint Augustine teaches when 
he writes: “I have met many who wanted to deceive, but none who 
wanted to be deceived.”38
This human desire to know “the objective reality of things,” John Paul 
II observes, “has driven so many enquiries, especially in the scientific  
field . . . .”39
The question, of course, is not whether human beings desire to 
know the truth—which they obviously do—but whether they can 
actually do so.  John Paul II considers it “unthinkable” that “a search 
so deeply rooted in human nature would be completely vain and 
useless.”40  The fact that we can search for the truth and pose 
questions about reality, he says, “implies the rudiments of a response.  
Human beings would not even begin to search for something of 
which they knew nothing or for something which they thought was 
wholly beyond them.  Only the sense that they can arrive at an answer 
leads them to take the first step.”41  For confirmation of this 
observation, John Paul II turns to the experience of scientists: 
When scientists, following their intuition, set out in search of the 
logical and verifiable explanation of a phenomenon, they are 
confident from the first that they will find an answer, and they do 
not give up in the face of setbacks.  They do not judge their 
original intuition useless simply because they have not reached 
their goal; rightly enough they will say that they have not yet 
found a satisfactory answer.42
The same logic leads John Paul II to conclude that we are 
capable of knowing the truth, not only about the physical world that 
surrounds us, but also about the ultimate questions of our origin and 
destiny which have occupied the thoughts of philosophers and 
ordinary men since the beginning of history: 
The thirst for truth is so rooted in the human heart that to be 
obliged to ignore it would cast our existence into jeopardy.  
Everyday life shows well enough how each one of us is 
preoccupied by the pressure of a few fundamental questions and 
 38 Fides et Ratio, supra note 36, ¶ 25 (internal citations omitted) (quoting ST. 
AUGUSTINE, CONFESSIONS, Bk. X, ch. xxiii, ¶ 33). 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. ¶ 29. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
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how in the soul of each of us there is at least an outline of the 
answers.43
Finally, John Paul II argues that we can have confidence in the 
truth of our conclusions in the search for answers to the ultimate 
questions about the meaning of life if they are substantially similar to 
those that men and women of different cultures have arrived at over 
the centuries: “One reason why the truth of these answers convinces 
is that they are no different in substance from the answers to which 
many others have come.”44  He is aware, of course, of the existence of 
a broad range of philosophical, theological, and religious positions, 
and readily concedes that “not every truth to which we come has the 
same value.”45  Nonetheless, he concludes that despite these 
differences, “the sum of the results achieved confirms that in 
principle the human being can arrive at the truth.”46
From the perspective of this somewhat lengthy discussion of 
human ability to know the truth in its many facets  (religious, ethical, 
scientific, practical),  we return to the topic of John Paul II’s view of 
freedom as the ability to choose the true and the good without 
external constraints.  John Paul II is fully aware that many 
contemporary partisans of relativism and skepticism view any claim to 
know the truth as a threat to freedom.  He argues, to the contrary, 
that relativism and skepticism lead only to an “illusory freedom.”47  
“Once the truth is denied to human beings,” he says, “it is pure 
illusion to try to set them free.  Truth and freedom either go together 
hand in hand or together they perish in misery.”48
 43 Id. 
 44 Fides et Ratio, supra note 36, ¶ 29. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id.  As the passages just quoted demonstrate, John Paul II is a vigorous 
defender of natural capacity of human beings to reach the truth and of reason’s 
“capacity to rise beyond what is contingent and set out towards the infinite.”  Id. ¶ 24.  
At the same time, he is convinced that in Christian revelation, “men and women are 
offered the ultimate truth about their own life and about the goal of history.  As the 
Constitution Gaudium et Spes puts it, ‘only in the mystery of the incarnate Word does 
the mystery of man take on light.’”  Id. ¶ 12 (quoting Gaudium et Spes, supra note 6,  
¶ 22). 
 47 Veritatis Splendor, supra note 17, ¶ 1. 
 48 Fides et Ratio, supra note 36, ¶ 90.  See Evangelium Vitae, supra note 13, ¶ 19 
(“[F]reedom negates and destroys itself, and becomes a factor leading to the 
destruction of others, when it no longer recognizes and respects its essential link to 
truth.”  Without a reference to the truth about moral good and evil, freedom ends 
up focused only on the individual’s “subjective and changeable opinion or, indeed, 
his selfish interest and whim.”); see also Pope John Paul II, Message to the Sixth 
Plenary Session of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences (Feb. 23, 2000), available 
at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/speeches/2000/jan-mar/docum 
ents/hf_jp-ii_spe_20000223_acd-sciences-plenary_en.html [hereinafter Message to 
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To best understand John Paul II’s view of the relationship 
between truth and freedom, one must examine his view of 
conscience.  Although a discussion of conscience may seem far 
removed from the concerns of the law, it is in fact a privileged 
vantage point for exploring the claims of truth and freedom. 
John Paul II considers a “heightened sense of the dignity of the 
human person and of his or her uniqueness, and of the respect due 
to the journey of conscience . . . one of the positive achievements of 
modern culture.”49  He rejects, however, exalting freedom “to such an 
extent that it becomes an absolute, which would then be the source of values.”50  
Specifically, he rejects the tendency “to grant to the individual 
conscience the prerogative of independently determining the criteria 
of good and evil, and then acting accordingly.”51
Human beings, and concretely conscience, according to John 
Paul II, do not create values or make things good or evil.  There are 
moral goods: values that make us more fully human, that make us 
“good persons,” when we choose them.  They are good because they 
accord with our nature, and ultimately with the plan the Creator had 
in making us.52
Conscience “is not an absolute placed above truth and error.  
Rather, by its very nature, it implies a relation to objective truth . . . .”53  
The function of conscience is not to make acts good or evil but “to 
apply the universal knowledge of the good in a specific situation and 
thus to express a judgment about the right conduct to be chosen 
here and now.”54  The fact—unfortunately attested to by our personal 
experience—that we can reject good and choose evil is a sign that we 
are free, but in John Paul II’s view it is a manifestation of the 
limitations of our freedom.55  We are most fully free when we freely 
choose the true and the good.56
Academy of Social Sciences] (“The freedom which the Church promotes attains its fullest 
development and expression only in openness to and acceptance of the truth.  ‘In a world 
without truth, freedom loses its foundation and man is exposed to the violence of 
passion and to manipulation, both open and hidden.’”  (emphasis added) (internal 
citation omitted) (quoting Centesimus Annus, supra note 15, ¶ 46)). 
 49 Veritatis Splendor, supra note 17, ¶ 31. 
 50 Id. ¶ 32 (emphasis in original). 
 51 Id. 
 52 See id. ¶¶ 9–13. 
 53 Pope John Paul II, Message for XXIV World Day for Peace (Jan. 1, 1991), 
available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/messages/peace/docu 
ments/hf_jp-ii_mes_08121990_xxiv-world-day-for-peace_en.html. 
 54 Veritatis Splendor, supra note 17, ¶ 32. 
 55 See Pope John Paul II, Message for XIV World Day for Peace ¶ 7 (Jan. 1, 1981), 
available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/messages/peace/docu 
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John Paul II is acutely aware of the fact that any claim to possess 
moral truth will be criticized by many as anti-democratic.  He 
responds, however, that democracy itself is weak and exposed to the 
danger of deteriorating into a tyranny of the majority (or of those 
who are able to manipulate majority opinion) unless it is founded on 
true values and ethical principles: 
“[I]f there is no ultimate truth to guide and direct political 
activity, then ideas and convictions can easily be manipulated for 
reasons of power.  As history demonstrates, a democracy without 
values easily turns into open or thinly disguised totalitarianism.” 
. . . [T]he defence of universal and unchanging moral norms 
is a service rendered not only to individuals but also to society as a 
whole: such norms “represent the unshakable foundation and 
solid guarantee of a just and peaceful human coexistence, and 
hence of genuine democracy.”  In fact, democracy itself is a means 
and not an end, and “the value of a democracy stands or falls with the 
values which it embodies and promotes.”  These values cannot be 
based on changeable opinion but only on the acknowledgement 
of an objective moral law, which ever remains the necessary point 
of reference.57
D. The Nature of Law 
Against this background, we can understand John Paul II’s 
concept of law, which closely follows the pattern set down by Thomas 
Aquinas.58  For John Paul II, as for Thomas Aquinas, law may 
ments/hf_jp-ii_mes_19801208_xiv-world-day-for-peace_en.html (“It is a caricature of 
freedom to claim that people are free to organize their lives with no reference to 
moral values, and to say that society does not have to ensure the protection and 
advancement of ethical values.”). 
 56 Veritatis Splendor, supra note 17, ¶¶ 31–56. 
 57 Message to Academy of Social Sciences, supra note 48, ¶ 2 (emphasis added) 
(quoting Centesimus Annus, supra note 15, ¶ 46; Veritatis Splendor, supra note 17, ¶ 96; 
Evangelium Vitae, supra note 13, ¶ 70).  John Paul II refers here to ethical principles 
and values rather than to strictly religious truths.  He is not calling for a theocracy, 
and in fact considers religious freedom an essential element of human flourishing.  
See, e.g.,  Pope John Paul II, Message for XXI World Day for Peace (Jan. 1, 1988), 
available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/messages/peace/do 
cuments/hf_jp-ii_mes_19871208_xxi-world-day-for-peace_en.html (“[R]eligious 
freedom, an essential requirement of the dignity of every person, is a cornerstone of 
the structure of human rights, and for this reason an irreplaceable factor in the good 
of individuals and of the whole of society, as well as of the personal fulfilment of each 
individual.”). 
 58 An interesting recent discussion of John Paul II’s jurisprudence can be found 
in Martin Rhonheimer, Fundamental Rights, Moral Law, and the Legal Defense of Life in a 
Constitutional Democracy: A Constitutionalist Approach to the Encyclical Evangelium Vitae, 
43 AM. J. JURIS. 135 (1998). 
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generally be thought of as “an ordinance of reason for the common 
good, made by him who has care of the community, and 
promulgated.”59  Unlike the positivistic conception which sees 
whatever the legislature (or in some cases, the courts) commands as 
law, thereby making the law essentially an act of the will of the 
legislator, John Paul II views law as primarily an act of reason which 
directs men toward their proper goal. 
John Paul II’s jurisprudence starts not with the acts of 
legislatures, but rather with God’s original plan for creating the 
universe, and specifically for creating human beings and bringing 
them to their fulfillment.  This divine plan, which John Paul II, 
following traditional Catholic teaching, refers to as the “divine law” or 
the “eternal law,” is “the divine wisdom as moving all things to their 
due end,”60 or viewed another way, “the reason or the will of God, 
who commands us to respect the natural order and forbids us to 
disturb it.”61
The divine plan for the universe and each of its parts is reflected 
in the laws of nature, which determine how things behave.  In their 
realm, the laws of nature leave no room for freedom or self-
determination.  But the moral law is different.  Human beings, in 
keeping with their dignity as persons, capable of knowing the good 
and freely choosing it, are not compelled to follow the moral law.  
Rather “reason, . . . by its natural knowledge of God’s eternal law, is  
. . . able to show man the right direction to take in his free actions.”62
Traditional Catholic thought has long referred to this “rational 
order whereby man is called by the Creator to direct and regulate his 
life and actions”63 as the natural law.  It “expresses and lays down the 
purposes, rights and duties which are based upon the bodily and 
spiritual nature of the human person.”64
 59 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, I–II, Q. 90, art. 4, available at 
http://www.newadvent.org/summa/209004.htm (last visited October 2, 2005). 
 60 Veritatis Splendor, supra note 17, ¶ 43 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, I–II, Q. 93, art. 1, available at 
http://www.newadvent.org/summa/209301.htm (last visited October 2, 2005)). 
 61 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting ST. AUGUSTINE, CONTRA 
FAUSTUM XXII, 27:PL 42, 418). 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. ¶ 50 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Congregation for the 
Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on Respect for Human Life in its Origin and on 
the Dignity of Procreation Donum Vitae, Intro. ¶ 3 (Feb. 22, 1987), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfait
h_doc_19870222_respect-for-human-life_en.html [hereinafter Donum Vitae]). 
 64 Id.  When talking about “human nature” in the context of natural law, the 
reference is to man’s condition as a person: “man’s proper and primordial nature, 
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In this vision, the natural law is not a series of arbitrary precepts, 
but a set of conclusions about what is fitting to our own nature and 
the nature of the world in which we live, conclusions that we reach by 
reflecting on ourselves and the world in which we live.  In this sense, 
John Paul II equates natural law with “human reason itself which 
commands us to do good and counsels us not to sin.”65  In this, he 
closely follows Thomas Aquinas who says that “in human actions, 
the ‘nature of the human person,’ which is the person himself in the unity of soul and 
body, in the unity of his spiritual and biological inclinations and of all the other 
specific characteristics necessary for the pursuit of his end.”  Id. (quoting Gaudium et 
Spes, supra note 6, ¶ 14). 
John Paul II stresses that the natural law cannot be reduced to a series of 
biological norms, but rather reflects the reality of man’s whole nature, both physical 
and spiritual.  He illustrates this point with the following example: 
[T]he origin and the foundation of the duty of absolute respect for 
human life are to be found in the dignity proper to the person and not 
simply in the natural inclination to preserve one’s own physical life.  
Human life, even though it is a fundamental good of man, thus 
acquires a moral significance in reference to the good of the person, 
who must always be affirmed for his own sake.  While it is always 
morally illicit to kill an innocent human being, it can be licit, 
praiseworthy or even imperative to give up one’s own life out of love of 
neighbour or as a witness to the truth.  Only in reference to the human 
person in his ‘unified totality,’ that is as ‘a soul which expresses itself in 
a body and a body informed by an immortal spirit,’ can the specifically 
human meaning of the body be grasped.  Indeed, natural inclinations 
take on moral relevance only insofar as they refer to the human person 
and his authentic fulfilment, a fulfilment which for that matter can 
take place always and only in human nature. 
Veritatis Splendor, supra note 17, ¶ 50 (internal citations omitted) (citing John 15:13; 
quoting Apostolic Exhortation of Pope John Paul II, Familiaris Consortio [The Role 
of the Christian Family in the Modern World] ¶ 11 (Nov. 22, 1981), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_exhortations/documents/hf
_jp-ii_exh_19811122_familiaris-consortio_en.html [hereinafter Familiaris Consortio]). 
 65 Id., ¶ 44 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Encyclical Letter from 
Pope Leo XIII to the Bishops of the Catholic Church, Libertas Praestantissimum [On 
the Nature of Human Liberty] ¶ 8 (June 20, 1888)).  Although the natural law 
consists in a series of rational conclusions about what is right, fitting, and in keeping 
with our human nature, it derives its obligatory force not simply from the fact that 
the conclusions are rational, but from the fact that they are the reflection of God’s 
plan for us, expressed in the eternal law.  See id. 
“[T]his prescription of human reason could not have the force of law 
unless it were the voice and the interpreter of some higher reason to 
which our spirit and our freedom must be subject.”  Indeed, the force 
of law consists in its authority to impose duties, to confer rights and to 
sanction certain behaviour: “Now all of this, clearly, could not exist in 
man if, as his own supreme legislator, he gave himself the rule of his 
own actions.” 
Id. (quoting Encyclical Letter from Pope Leo XIII to the Bishops of the Catholic 
Church, Libertas Praestantissimum [On the Nature of Human Liberty] ¶ 8 (June 20, 
1888)). 
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good and evil are predicated in reference to the reason; because as 
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), ‘the good of man is to be in accordance 
with reason,’ and evil is ‘to be against reason.’”66
John Paul II’s stress on the natural law’s connections with the 
eternal law and its roots in man’s status as a creature created by God 
might seem to suggest that natural law really is not natural at all, and 
has little relevance except to those who accept Christian revelation.  
John Paul II does not see things that way.  He is convinced that Christ 
“fully reveals man to himself and brings to light his most high calling.”67  
Consequently, the natural law is more easily discerned by reason 
“enlightened by Divine Revelation and by faith.”68  Nonetheless, he 
stresses repeatedly “the role of human reason in discovering and 
applying the moral law.”69  He views the principal tenets of the moral 
law70 not as religious precepts, but as truths about who we are and 
what it means to flourish as a human being, truths which reason can 
attain even without the help of Christian revelation.  Consequently, 
“the ‘natural law’ written in the human heart”71 is available to all men 
and women, whether believers or not, and should inform their 
individual and social conduct, including the civil law. 
In John Paul II’s jurisprudence, civil law—whether statutory, 
judge-made, or merely customary—is, like any other type of law, “an 
ordinance of reason.”72  To be a valid “ordinance of reason,” it must 
possess not merely instrumental rationality—the choice of suitable 
means to achieve the desired goal73—but the deeper substantive 
rationality of contributing to human flourishing because the goals it 
pursues respect “those essential and innate human and moral values 
which flow from the very truth of the human being and express and 
safeguard the dignity of the person . . . .”74  In this sense, John Paul II, 
 66 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, I–II, Q. 18, art. 5, available at http:// 
www.newadvent.org/summa/201805.htm (last visited October 2, 2005). 
 67 Redemptor Hominis, supra note 1, ¶ 8 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Gaudium et Spes, supra note 6, ¶ 22). 
 68 Veritatis Splendor, supra note 17, ¶ 44 (emphasis omitted). 
 69 Id. ¶ 40 (emphasis omitted). 
 70 Pope John Paul II, Angelus Message (Feb. 27, 2000), available at http://www.va 
tican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/angelus/2000/documents/hf_jp-ii_ang_2000022 
7_en.html  (The principal precepts of the natural law, John Paul II teaches, are 
reflected in the commandments of the Decalogue.). 
 71 Evangelium Vitae, supra note 13, ¶ 70. 
 72 AQUINAS, supra note 59, I–II, Q. 90, art. 4. 
 73 For examples of the rational basis test used by the Supreme Court in due 
process cases, see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 1039 (1986), and Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 74 Evangelium Vitae, supra note 13, ¶ 71. 
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quoting Thomas Aquinas, argues that valid civil laws must respect the 
natural law: “Every law made by man can be called a law insofar as it 
derives from the natural law.  But if it is somehow opposed to the 
natural law, then it is not really a law but rather a corruption of the 
law.”75
John Paul II rejects the contention that democracy means that 
“the legal system of any society should limit itself to taking account of 
and accepting the convictions of the majority” or that it should be 
“based solely upon what the majority itself considers moral and 
actually practises.”76  He also rejects the contention that relativism 
“guarantee[s] tolerance, mutual respect between people and 
acceptance of the decisions of the majority,” and the correlative 
contention that “moral norms considered to be objective and binding 
lead to authoritarianism and intolerance.”77
He acknowledges that “history has known cases where crimes 
have been committed in the name of ‘truth,’” but he points out that 
“equally grave crimes . . . have also been committed and are still 
being committed in the name of ‘ethical relativism.’”78  Everyone, he 
observes, is horrified by the crimes against humanity which 
proliferated in the twentieth century.  But, he asks, “would these 
crimes cease to be crimes if, instead of being committed by 
unscrupulous tyrants, they were legitimated by popular consensus?”79
 75 Id. ¶ 72 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, 
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, I–II, Q. 93, art. 3, available at http://www.newadvent.org/ 
summa/209301.htm (last visited October 2, 2005) (“[H]uman law has the nature of 
law in so far as it partakes of right reason; and it is clear that, in this respect, it is 
derived from the eternal law.  But in so far as it deviates from reason, it is called an 
unjust law, and has the nature, not of law but of violence.”).  This is the position 
taken by Martin Luther King in his Letter from Birmingham Jail: 
I would agree with St. Augustine that “an unjust law is no law at all.” 
Now, what is the difference between the two?  How does one 
determine whether a law is just or unjust?  A just law is a man-made 
code that squares with the moral law or the law of God.  An unjust law 
is a code that is out of harmony with the moral law.  To put it in the 
terms of St. Thomas Aquinas: An unjust law is a human law that is not 
rooted in eternal law and natural law.  Any law that uplifts human 
personality is just.  Any law that degrades human personality is unjust. 
Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail (Apr. 16, 1963), available at 
http://www.nobelprizes.com/nobel/peace/MLK-jail.html. 
 76 Evangelium Vitae, supra note 13, ¶ 69. 
 77 Id. ¶ 70. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id.  American history provides painfully compelling evidence for the 
proposition that majority support is no guarantee that laws are just.  For long periods 
of time, slavery, extermination of the Native American population, and the Jim Crow 
laws enjoyed majority support in our country.  See, e.g., JACQUELINE JONES ET. AL, 
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John Paul II recognizes the virtues of democratic government to 
the extent that “it ensures the participation of citizens in making 
political choices, guarantees to the governed the possibility both of 
electing and holding accountable those who govern them, and of 
replacing them through peaceful means when appropriate.”80  That is 
not to say, however, that democracy is “a substitute for morality or a 
panacea for immorality.”81
Democracy is merely a system of government and as such “a 
means and not an end.”82  The moral value of democracy, apart from 
the instrumental values it embodies, “depends on conformity to the 
moral law to which it, like every other form of human behaviour, 
must be subject. . . .  [I]ts morality depends on the morality of the 
ends which it pursues and of the means which it employs.”83  
Widespread consensus in favor of democracy is a positive 
development, but “the value of democracy stands or falls with the 
values which it embodies and promotes.”84
John Paul II notes with approval the values that generally prevail 
in democratic systems such as “the dignity of every human person, 
respect for inviolable and inalienable human rights, and the 
adoption of the ‘common good’ as the end and criterion regulating 
political life. . . .”85  These values, however, he contends, need a more 
solid and stable foundation than “provisional and changeable 
‘majority’ opinions.”86  They will not be secure unless they are based 
on “the acknowledgment of an objective moral law which, as the 
‘natural law’ written in the human heart, is the obligatory point of 
reference for civil law itself.”87
Democracy would be in danger, and would lose its moral value 
“[i]f, as a result of a tragic obscuring of the collective conscience, an 
attitude of scepticism were to succeed in bringing into question even 
the fundamental principles of the moral law.”88  Without a 
CREATED EQUAL: A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (Longman 
2005). 
 80 Centesimus Annus, supra note 15, ¶ 46. 
 81 Evangelium Vitae, supra note 13, ¶ 70. 
 82 Id.  For an analysis of John Paul II’s thought on democracy, see Douglas W. 
Kmiec, Is the American Democracy Compatible with the Catholic Faith?, 41 AM. J. JURIS. 69 
(1996). 
 83 Evangelium Vitae, supra note 13, ¶ 70. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
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foundation in stable moral convictions, democracy itself “would be 
reduced to a mere mechanism for regulating different and opposing 
interests on a purely empirical basis.”89
E. The Dignity and Role of Women in Society 
John Paul II calls for recognizing “the equal dignity and 
responsibility of women with men.”90  He laments the existence of “a 
widespread social and cultural tradition [that] has considered 
women’s role to be exclusively that of wife and mother, without 
adequate access to public functions . . . .”91  Women, he says, “have 
the same right as men to perform various public functions.”92  More 
broadly, he sees “an urgent need to achieve real equality in every area: 
equal pay for equal work, protection for working mothers, fairness in 
career advancements, equality of spouses with regard to family rights 
and the recognition of everything that is part of the rights and duties 
of citizens in a democratic State.”93
Men and women, however, have in John Paul II’s view “[a] 
specific diversity and personal originality.”94  They are 
 89 Evangelium Vitae, supra note 13, ¶ 70. 
 90 Familiaris Consortio, supra note 64, ¶ 22.  He finds strong support for this 
position in the Bible.  See id. 
In creating the human race “male and female,” God gives man and 
woman an equal personal dignity, endowing them with the inalienable 
rights and responsibilities proper to the human person.  God then 
manifests the dignity of women in the highest form possible, by 
assuming human flesh from the Virgin Mary, whom the Church honors 
as the Mother of God, calling her the new Eve and presenting her as 
the model of redeemed woman.  The sensitive respect of Jesus towards 
the women that He called to His following and His friendship, His 
appearing on Easter morning to a woman before the other disciples, 
the mission entrusted to women to carry the good news of the 
Resurrection to the apostles—these are all signs that confirm the 
special esteem of the Lord Jesus for women.  The Apostle Paul will say: 
“In Christ Jesus you are all children of God through faith. . . .  There is 
neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither 
male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus.” 
Id. (internal citations omitted) (quoting Genesis 1:27; Galatians 3:26–28) 
 91 Id. ¶ 23. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Letter from Pope John Paul II to Women ¶ 4 (Jun. 29, 1995), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/letters/documents/hf_jp-ii_let_29 
061995_women_en.html [hereinafter Letter to Women]. 
 94 Mulieris Dignitatem, supra note 11, ¶ 10. 
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complementary.95  “The personal resources of femininity,” he says, 
“are certainly no less than the resources of masculinity,” but they are 
“different.”96
[A] woman . . . must understand her ‘fulfilment’ as a person, her 
dignity and vocation, on the basis of these resources, according to 
the richness of the femininity which she received on the day of 
creation and which she inherits as an expression of the ‘image 
and likeness of God’ that is specifically hers.97   
The equality of men and women, in John Paul II’s view, “goes hand in 
hand with the recognition of differences inherent in them since 
creation.”98
In John Paul II’s conception, “the dignity of women is measured 
by the order of love, which is essentially the order of justice and 
charity.”99  This means that “God entrusts the human being to [women] in 
a special way,”100 and that the defining characteristic of femininity is 
“sensitivity for human beings in every circumstance: because they are 
human!”101
Masculinity and femininity are not accidental or secondary 
characteristics, but rather different specific ways of being human, that 
go to the heart of who the person is and what he or she does.  
Masculinity and femininity manifest themselves “within all the 
interpersonal relationships which, in the most varied ways, shape 
society and structure the interaction between all persons.”102  
 95 Pope John Paul II, Angelus Message (Mar. 8, 1998), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/angelus/1998/documents/hf_jp-ii 
_ang_08031998_en.html (“Man and woman complement each other not only 
physically and psychologically at the level of behaviour, but more profoundly at the 
level of being.”).  Commenting on the account of creation in Genesis 2:18, in which 
God says: “It is not good that the man should be alone; I will make him a helper fit 
for him,” John Paul II notes: 
The creation of woman is thus marked from the outset by the principle of 
help: a help which is not one-sided but mutual.  Woman complements 
man, just as man complements woman: men and women are 
complementary. Womanhood expresses the ‘human’ as much as 
manhood does, but in a different and complementary way. 
Letter to Women, supra note 93, ¶ 7. 
 96 Mulieris Dignitatem, supra note 11, ¶ 10. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Pope John Paul II, Address to an International Meeting on Promoting the 
Well-Being of Women (Dec. 7, 1996), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_ 
father/john_paul_ii/speeches/1996/december/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_19961207_ 
motherhood_en.html. 
 99 Mulieris Dignitatem, supra note 11, ¶ 29 (emphasis omitted). 
 100 Id. ¶ 30. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. ¶ 29. 
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Specifically, “a woman represents a particular value by the fact that she is a 
human person, and, at the same time, this particular person, by the fact 
of her femininity.”103
If femininity is for women (as masculinity is for men) part of 
their personal identity, women should not be required to sacrifice 
their femininity in order to pursue a career or play an active role in 
public life. 
In the name of liberation from male “domination,” women 
must not appropriate to themselves male characteristics contrary 
to their own feminine “originality.”  There is a well-founded fear 
that if they take this path, women will not “reach fulfillment,” but 
instead will deform and lose what constitutes their essential richness.104
More specifically, John Paul II calls for overcoming “the 
mentality which honors women more for their work outside the 
home than for their work within the family,” and demands “clear 
recognition” of “the value of [women’s] maternal and family role.”105  
On this basis, society needs to develop structures that allow women to 
“harmoniously combine[]” their  roles in the professions and in 
public life with their maternal and family roles.106
John Paul II calls for social and economic structures that “make 
it possible for a mother—without inhibiting her freedom, without 
psychological or practical discrimination, and without penalizing her 
as compared with other women—to devote herself to taking care of 
her children and educating them in accordance with their needs, 
which vary with age.”107  John Paul II recognizes that some, perhaps 
many, women will prefer to or need to combine paid work outside 
the home with the tasks of raising children, and as we have seen, 
defends their right to do so.  He asserts, however, that having to 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. ¶ 10.  In John Paul II’s vision, “woman and man are marked neither by a 
static and undifferentiated equality nor by an irreconcilable and inexorably 
conflictual difference.  Their most natural relationship, which corresponds to the 
plan of God, is the ‘unity of the two,’ a relational ‘uni-duality,’ which enables each to 
experience their interpersonal and reciprocal relationship as a gift which enriches 
and which confers responsibility.”  Letter to Women, supra note 93, ¶ 8. 
 105 Familiaris Consortio, supra note 64, ¶ 23.  Cf., e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, The Day, 
Berry & Howard Visiting Scholar: The Value Of Black Mothers’ Work, 26 CONN. L. REV. 871 
(1994) (criticizing policies of forcing welfare mothers to put their children in day 
care and take up paid work); JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND 
WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2000) (arguing that workplaces are 
designed around male life patterns in ways that discriminate against women, and that 
the work/family system that results is bad for women but also for men and children). 
 106 Familiaris Consortio, supra note 64, ¶ 23. 
 107 Laborem Exercens, supra note 9, ¶ 19. 
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abandon care of the family “in order to take up paid work outside the 
home is wrong from the point of view of the good of society and of 
the family when it contradicts or hinders these primary goals of the 
mission of a mother.”108
II. APPLICATIONS 
John Paul II’s most important legacy to lawyers is the 
philosophical and theological anthropology we have just explored, 
particularly his articulation of the connection between truth and 
freedom.  He has not attempted to sketch out a single “Catholic” 
solution to the specific problems that are debated in the political 
arena.  He recognizes that specific solutions can only be crafted by 
people with close-up knowledge of each situation and with the 
requisite technical information and practical wisdom.109  Neither, 
however, has he limited himself to setting forth the broad-brushed 
vision of what it means to be human which we have just summarized.  
In a number of areas, he has drawn intermediate level consequences 
from the broad principles previously examined.  In the second half of 
this Article, we turn our attention to some of the areas where he has 
done so. 
A. The Right to Life 
The value of human life and the need to develop a “culture of 
life” in the face of what he describes as a “culture of death”110 are 
some of the best known aspects of John Paul II’s thought.  He returns 
to them frequently, calling repeatedly for “absolute respect for life 
from conception to natural death.”111
 108 Id. ¶ 20. 
 109 See Centesimus Annus, supra note 15, ¶ 43 (“The Church has no models to 
present; models that are real and truly effective can only arise within the framework 
of different historical situations, through the efforts of all those who responsibly 
confront concrete problems. . . . ”). 
 110 Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation of Pope John Paul II, Ecclesia in America  
¶ 63 (Jan. 22, 1999), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/ 
apost_exhortations/documents/hf_jp-ii_exh_22011999_ecclesia-in-america_en.html 
[hereinafter Ecclesia in America]. 
 111 Letter from Pope John Paul II to Cardinal Bernard Law (Dec. 29, 1997), 
available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/letters/1997/documen 
ts/hf_jp-ii_let_19971229_cardinal-law_en.html. 
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His veneration for human life has deep religious roots.112  He 
sees human life not merely as something of value, but also as sacred: 
“Man’s life comes from God; it is his gift, his image and imprint, a 
sharing in his breath of life.  God therefore is the sole Lord of this 
life.”113  “The sacredness of life gives rise its inviolability.”114
Nonetheless, he asserts that the value of life and the duty to 
protect it are not merely religious truths to be preached to believers, 
but natural moral or ethical truths that every man and woman can 
grasp: 
Even in the midst of difficulties and uncertainties, every person 
sincerely open to truth and goodness can, by the light of reason 
and the hidden action of grace, come to recognize in the natural 
law written in the heart the sacred value of human life from its 
very beginning until its end, and can affirm the right of every 
human being to have this primary good respected to the highest 
degree. Upon the recognition of this right, every human 
community and the political community itself are founded.115
John Paul II has applied these principles to a range of issues 
including euthanasia and the death penalty.  He has been especially 
insistent, however, in condemning abortion.  To that issue, we turn 
first. 
 112 He begins his longest and most focused treatment of the question of life and 
the respect due to it with the words: 
The Gospel of life is at the heart of Jesus’ message. Lovingly 
received day after day by the Church, it is to be preached with 
dauntless fidelity as “good news” to the people of every age and 
culture. 
. . . . 
Man is called to a fullness of life which far exceeds the dimensions 
of his earthly existence, because it consists in sharing the very life of 
God.  The loftiness of this supernatural vocation reveals the greatness 
and the inestimable value of human life even in its temporal phase.  
Life in time, in fact, is the fundamental condition, the initial stage and 
an integral part of the entire unified process of human existence.  It is 
a process which, unexpectedly and undeservedly, is enlightened by the 
promise and renewed by the gift of divine life, which will reach its full 
realization in eternity.  At the same time, it is precisely this 
supernatural calling which highlights the relative character of each 
individual’s earthly life. After all, life on earth is not an “ultimate” but a 
“penultimate” reality; even so, it remains a sacred reality entrusted to 
us, to be preserved with a sense of responsibility and brought to 
perfection in love and in the gift of ourselves to God and to our 
brothers and sisters. 
Evangelium Vitae, supra note 13, ¶¶ 1–2 (internal citation omitted) (citing John 3:1–2). 
 113 Id. ¶ 39. 
 114 Id. ¶ 40. 
 115 Id. ¶ 2 (citing Romans 2:14–15). 
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1. Abortion 
John Paul II is aware that powerful reasons may sometimes 
counsel an abortion: 
[T]he decision to have an abortion is often tragic and painful for 
the mother, insofar as the decision to rid herself of the fruit of 
conception is not made for purely selfish reasons or out of 
convenience, but out of a desire to protect certain important 
values such as her own health or a decent standard of living for 
the other members of the family.  Sometimes it is feared that the 
child to be born would live in such conditions that it would be 
better if the birth did not take place.116
Nonetheless, he says, the unborn child is “a human being at the very 
beginning of life,”117 and no reasons, “however serious and tragic, can 
[]ever justify the deliberate killing of an innocent human being.”118
One could agree that deliberate killing of innocent human 
beings is never justifiable and yet defend abortion on grounds that up 
to some point of development, the fetus is not a human person.  John 
Paul II rejects that position: 
[F]rom the time that the ovum is fertilized, a life is begun which 
is neither that of the father nor the mother; it is rather the life of 
a new human being with his own growth.  It would never be made 
human if it were not human already.  This has always been clear, 
and . . . modern genetic science offers clear confirmation.  It has 
demonstrated that from the first instant there is established the 
programme of what this living being will be: a person, this 
individual person with his characteristic aspects already well 
determined.119
Even if it were not clear that from the moment of conception 
the unborn child is a human being with a right to life, John Paul II 
argues that any doubt should be resolved in favor of protecting its 
rights: 
[W]hat is at stake is so important that, from the standpoint of 
moral obligation, the mere probability that a human person is 
involved would suffice to justify an absolutely clear prohibition of 
any intervention aimed at killing a human embryo.  Precisely for 
this reason, over and above all scientific debates and those 
 116 Id. ¶ 58. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Evangelium Vitae, supra note 13, ¶ 58.  On John Paul II’s position on abortion, 
see Charles E. Rice, Abortion, Euthanasia, And The Need To Build A New ‘Culture Of Life’, 
12 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 497 (1998). 
 119 Evangelium Vitae, supra note 13, ¶ 60 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Donum Vitae, supra note 63). 
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philosophical affirmations to which the Magisterium has not 
expressly committed itself, the Church has always taught and 
continues to teach that the result of human procreation, from the 
first moment of its existence, must be guaranteed that 
unconditional respect which is morally due to the human being 
in his or her totality and unity as body and spirit.120
He recognizes that civil law need not—indeed, should not—
prohibit every immoral action, but he rejects the contention that this 
principle can justify legalizing abortion: 
[C]ivil law must ensure that all members of society enjoy respect 
for certain fundamental rights which innately belong to the 
person, rights which every positive law must recognize and 
guarantee.  First and fundamental among these is the inviolable 
right to life of every innocent human being.  While public 
authority can sometimes choose not to put a stop to something 
which—were it prohibited—would cause more serious harm, it 
can never presume to legitimize as a right of individuals—even if 
they are the majority of the members of society—an offence 
against other persons caused by the disregard of so fundamental a 
right as the right to life. 121
He also denies that legal toleration of abortion can be justified 
by appealing to the respect owed to individual conscience.  Although 
John Paul II is a passionate defender of the dignity of individual 
conscience and of the need to respect it,122 he recognizes that 
individual conscience can be mistaken.123  When the mistake involves 
serious harm to others, society cannot simply tolerate the harm on 
grounds that the perpetrator believes his or her act is justified.  
“[S]ociety has the right and the duty to protect itself against the 
abuses which can occur in the name of conscience and under the 
pretext of freedom.”124
2. Euthanasia 
At the opposite end of life, John Paul II sees the growing 
acceptance of euthanasia as “one of the more alarming symptoms of 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. ¶ 71.  John Paul II describes recognition of the absolute equality of every 
innocent human being with regard to the right to life as “the basis of all authentic 
social relationships which, to be truly such, can only be founded on truth and justice, 
recognizing and protecting every man and woman as a person and not as an object 
to be used.”  Id. ¶ 57. 
 122 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 123 See Veritatis Splendor, supra note 17, ¶ 62. 
 124 Evangelium Vitae, supra note 13, ¶ 71. 
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the ‘culture of death.’”125  He finds its roots in three phenomena, not 
all of which underlie every decision in favor of euthanasia: a cult of 
efficiency and an excessive concern with economic values; a 
conception of freedom which extends to the right to determine the 
limits of one’s own existence; and finally, a view of life which finds no 
value or meaning in suffering.126
In some cases, support for euthanasia derives from 
an attitude of excessive preoccupation with efficiency . . . which 
sees the growing number of elderly and disabled people as 
intolerable and too burdensome.  These people are very often 
isolated by their families and by society, which are organized 
almost exclusively on the basis of criteria of productive efficiency, 
according to which a hopelessly impaired life no longer has any 
value.127
As a counterweight to this attitude which values persons primarily as 
producers and consumers, John Paul II offers his vision of the 
intrinsic dignity and value of human life, independent of the person’s 
economic and other contributions and achievements.128
A second factor underlying support for euthanasia is the 
conviction that each person is “his own rule and measure, with the 
right to demand that society should guarantee him the ways and 
means of deciding what to do with his life in full and complete 
autonomy.”129  In contrast to this vision, John Paul II argues that our 
freedom does not involve the autonomy to make things good by 
choosing them.  Rather, he says, there are moral goods that lead to 
authentic human fulfillment because they reflect the creator’s plan 
and design.  Human beings are called to use their reason to seek and 
recognize those values, and their freedom to choose them.  Beyond 
that, they cannot go.  No matter how intensely they desire something 
evil, desire does not make it good. 130  Concretely, it is not given to 
human beings to choose the time of their own death or that of 
 125 Id. ¶ 64. 
 126 See id. ¶¶ 24, 64–67.  For an analysis of John Paul II’s thought on euthanasia, 
see Richard S. Myers, An Analysis of the Constitutionality of Laws Banning Assisted Suicide 
from the Perspective of Catholic Moral Teaching, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 771 (1995). 
 127 Evangelium Vitae, supra note 13, ¶ 64. 
 128 See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing the foundation of human 
dignity in the fact of being a person created in the image and likeness of God); infra 
notes 150–171 and accompanying text (discussing John Paul II’s position that even 
work derives its value primarily from the fact that it is an activity of a person rather 
than from what it produces). 
 129 Evangelium Vitae, supra note 13, ¶ 64. 
 130 See supra Part I.C–D (discussing John Paul II’s view of the moral good, 
conscience and the natural law). 
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another person, and to do so is to act against the good of life, 
whatever the circumstances.131
Finally, John Paul II identifies at the root of euthanasia an 
attitude that values life “only to the extent that it brings pleasure and 
well-being,” and that sees suffering as “an unbearable setback, 
something from which one must be freed at all costs.”132  Euthanasia 
is seen in this light as a compassionate response to the sufferings of 
others.133  His reply to this attitude is particularly closely bound to 
religious faith.  Suffering, he says, has meaning and value because it 
serves to “repay the objective evil of the [sufferer’s moral] 
transgression[s] with another evil, but first and foremost because it 
creates the possibility of rebuilding goodness in the subject who 
suffers.”134
Beyond this answer, which can already be found in the book of 
Job, John Paul II points to Christ’s passion as the ultimate answer to 
the question about the role of suffering in our lives: 
[Every person is] called to share in that suffering through which 
the Redemption was accomplished.  He is called to share in that 
suffering through which all human suffering has also been 
redeemed.  In bringing about the Redemption through suffering, 
Christ has also raised human suffering to the level of the 
Redemption.  Thus each man, in his suffering, can also become a 
sharer in the redemptive sufferings of Christ.135
At one level, this means that through suffering the person who suffers 
opens himself to Christ’s redeeming action.  “[T]o suffer means to 
become particularly susceptible, particularly open to the working of 
the salvific powers of God . . . .”136  At another level, it means that the 
sufferer in some way “completes the suffering through which Christ 
accomplished the Redemption of the world.”137
 131 Evangelium Vitae, supra note 13, ¶ 66 (“[I]t is never licit to kill another: even if 
he should wish it, indeed if he request it because, hanging between life and death, he 
begs for help in freeing the soul struggling against the bonds of the body and 
longing to be released; nor is it licit even when a sick person is no longer able to 
live.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting St. Augustine, Ep. 204, 5 (CSEL 
57) 320)). 
 132 Id. ¶ 64. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Apostolic Letter of Pope John Paul II, Salvifici Doloris [On the Christian 
Meaning of Human Suffering] ¶ 12 (Feb. 11, 1984), available at http://www.vatican. 
va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_letters/documents/hf_jp-ii_apl_11021984_salvifi 
ci-doloris_en.html [hereinafter Salvifici Doloris]. 
 135 Id. ¶ 19 (emphasis omitted). 
 136 Id. ¶ 24 (emphasis omitted). 
 137 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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Having examined the various factors that contribute to the 
growing acceptance of euthanasia, John Paul II concludes that 
euthanasia properly so called involves the “morally unacceptable 
killing of a human person”138 and cannot be justified either by “a 
misguided pity at the sight of the patient’s suffering” or by “the 
utilitarian motive of avoiding costs which bring no return and which 
weigh heavily on society.”139
This does not mean that John Paul II believes that in all 
circumstances everything that can be done to prolong life should be 
done.  “[T]here is,” he says, 
a moral obligation to care for oneself and to allow oneself to be 
cared for, but this duty must take account of concrete 
circumstances. . . .  To forego extraordinary or disproportionate 
means is not the equivalent of suicide or euthanasia; it rather 
expresses acceptance of the human condition in the face of 
death.140   
Such measures, he says, “no longer correspond to the real situation of 
the patient, either because they are by now disproportionate to any 
expected results or because they impose an excessive burden on the 
patient and his family.”141
More specifically, he says that it is not euthanasia, “when death is 
clearly imminent and inevitable, . . . [to] ‘refuse forms of treatment 
that would only secure a precarious and burdensome prolongation of 
life, so long as the normal care due to the sick person in similar cases 
is not interrupted.’”142  The euthanasia he rejects as immoral is “an 
 138 Evangelium Vitae, supra note 13, ¶ 65. 
 139 Id. ¶ 15. 
 140 Id. ¶ 65. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. (quoting Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Declaration on 
Euthanasia, ¶ IV (May 5, 1980), available at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/con 
gregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19800505_euthanasia_en.html).  
John Paul II requires two conditions for not giving treatment that would “only secure 
a precarious and burdensome prolongation of life.”  First, that “death is clearly 
imminent and inevitable,” and second, that “normal care due to the sick person . . . 
is not interrupted.”  Id. 
In March 2004, John Paul II clarified what he understands by “normal care.”  
Address on Life-Sustaining Treatments, supra note 14.  “The sick person in a vegetative 
state, awaiting recovery or a natural end, still has the right to basic health care 
(nutrition, hydration, cleanliness, warmth, etc.), and to the prevention of 
complications related to his confinement to bed.  He also has the right to 
appropriate rehabilitative care and to be monitored for clinical signs of eventual 
recovery.”  Id. 
I should like particularly to underline how the administration of 
water and food, even when provided by artificial means, always 
represents a natural means of preserving life, not a medical act.  Its use, 
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action or omission which of itself and by intention causes death, with 
the purpose of eliminating all suffering.”143
3. The Death Penalty 
John Paul II’s belief that the ultimate dignity and worth of 
human beings depends on their having been created in the image 
and likeness of God, rather than on their personal merits, lies at the 
foundation of his opposition to the death penalty.144  “[T]he dignity 
of human life,”  he says, “must never be taken away, even in the case 
of someone who has done great evil.”145
John Paul II recognizes the three classic goals of punishment: 
retribution, defense of society, and rehabilitation.  To achieve all 
three goals of punishment, “the nature and extent of the punishment 
must be carefully evaluated.”146  Although he sees “redress[ing] the 
violation of personal and social rights” as the “primary purpose” of 
punishment,147 the value of human life and the need to offer the 
offender the possibility of rehabilitation mean, in his view, that 
retribution alone cannot justify capital punishment.  It can be 
justified only in cases “of absolute necessity . . . when it would not be 
possible otherwise to defend society.”148
furthermore, should be considered, in principle, ordinary and 
proportionate, and as such morally obligatory, insofar as and until it is 
seen to have attained its proper finality, which in the present case 
consists in providing nourishment to the patient and alleviation of his 
suffering. 
. . . . 
The obligation to provide the “normal care due to the sick in such 
cases”  includes, in fact, the use of nutrition and hydration.  The 
evaluation of probabilities, founded on waning hopes for recovery 
when the vegetative state is prolonged beyond a year, cannot ethically 
justify the cessation or interruption of minimal care for the patient, 
including nutrition and hydration.  Death by starvation or dehydration 
is, in fact, the only possible outcome as a result of their withdrawal.  In 
this sense it ends up becoming, if done knowingly and willingly, true 
and proper euthanasia by omission. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 143 Evangelium Vitae, supra note 13, ¶ 65. 
 144 Cf. Michael R. Merz, Is the Death Penalty on Life Support?: Conscience of a Catholic 
Judge, 29 U. DAYTON L. REV. 305 (2004) (discussing John Paul II’s position on the 
death penalty). 
 145 Pope John Paul II, Homily at Mass in Trans World Dome, St. Louis, Missouri 
(Jan. 27, 1999), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/travels/ 
documents/hf_jp-ii_hom_27011999_stlouis_en.html. 
 146 Evangelium Vitae, supra note 13, ¶ 56. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
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On the practical level, John Paul II argues that under 
contemporary conditions, capital punishment cannot be justified 
since modern societies can defend themselves without resort to it: 
“Today, given the means at the State’s disposal to deal with crime and 
control those who commit it, without abandoning all hope of their 
redemption, the cases where it is absolutely necessary to do away with 
an offender ‘are now very rare, even non-existent practically.’”149
B. Work 
John Paul II’s personalist philosophy comes to the fore in his 
approach to work, a subject to which he dedicated an entire 
encyclical letter, Laborem Exercens.150  His primary focus is not on 
productive physical and intellectual activities as such, nor on the 
products they produce or the services they provide.151  He gives only 
cursory attention to all of this, which he refers to as “work in the 
objective sense.”152  His primary interest is in “work in the subjective 
sense,” and on “man as the subject of work.”153
By “work in the subjective sense,” he means the human activities 
that make up work, considered not as producing external results but 
rather as human actions performed by a free subject endowed with 
intellect and will.  Machines can produce goods and services, but 
because of his emphasis on the subjective aspect of work, John Paul II 
does not think of them as “working” in the proper sense: “the proper 
subject of work continues to be man.”154  Only men and women 
“work” in the full and proper sense of the term precisely because they 
are persons “capable of acting in a planned and rational way, capable 
of deciding about [themselves], and with a tendency to self-
realization.”155  For this reason, “[a]s a person, man is . . . the subject 
ot [sic] work,”156 and work “concerns not only the economy but also, 
and especially, personal values.”157
The economic value of work springs, of course, from the goods 
and services it produces, but John Paul II is more interested in its 
ethical value, which derives from “the fact that the one who carries it 
 149 Ecclesia in America, supra note 110, ¶ 63 (citing Catechism of the Catholic Church  
§ 2267 (citing Evangelium Vitae, supra note 13, ¶ 56)). 
 150 Laborem Exercens, supra note 9. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. ¶ 5. 
 153 Id. ¶ 6. 
 154 Id. ¶ 5 (emphasis omitted). 
 155 Id. ¶ 6. 
 156 Laborem Exercens, supra note 9, ¶ 6 (emphasis omitted). 
 157 Id. ¶ 15. 
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out is a person, a conscious and free subject, that is to say a subject 
that decides about himself.”158  “The sources of the dignity of work 
are to be sought primarily in the subjective dimension, not in the 
objective one.”159  John Paul II finds in the example of Jesus Christ, 
who dedicated most of his life to manual labor, confirmation for this 
conviction that “the basis for determining the value of human work is 
not primarily the kind of work being done but the fact that the one 
who is doing it is a person.”160
Although work can be difficult and painful, it is not a necessary 
evil, something to which we are driven only by necessity.  Quite to the 
contrary, John Paul II sees it as “a good thing for man”:161
It is not only good in the sense that it is useful or something to 
enjoy; it is also good as being something worthy, that is to say, 
something that corresponds to man’s dignity, that expresses this 
dignity and increases it. . . .  Work is a good thing for man—a 
good thing for his humanity—because through work man not only 
transforms nature, adapting it to his own needs, but he also achieves 
fulfilment as a human being and indeed, in a sense, becomes 
“more a human being.”162
But work does not always lead to human fulfillment.  Leaving 
aside the extreme case of the labor camps where work is used to 
destroy human beings, work can be organized in ways that are more 
or less fulfilling.  John Paul II, therefore considers it essential to 
create a 
social order of work, which will enable man to become, in work, 
“more a human being” and not be degraded by it not only 
because of the wearing out of his physical strength (which, at least 
up to a certain point, is inevitable), but especially through 
damage to the dignity and subjectivity that are proper to him.163
John Paul II rejects what he classifies as “materialistic and 
economistic”164 conceptions which treat “work as a special kind of 
‘merchandise,’ or as an impersonal ‘force’ needed for production.”165  
 158 Id. ¶ 6.  John Paul II says that this proposition “in a sense constitutes the 
fundamental and perennial heart of Christian teaching on human work.”  Id. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Laborem Exercens, supra note 9. 
 161 Id. ¶ 9. 
 162 Id.  Because he views work as contributing to human development—and as a 
way of participating in the life of the community—John Paul II calls for finding ways 
in which the disabled can work.  Providing them work suited to their circumstances 
is, he says “demanded by their dignity as persons and as subjects of work.”  Id. ¶ 22. 
 163 Id. ¶ 9. 
 164 Id. ¶ 7. 
 165 Laborem Exercens, supra note 9, ¶ 7. 
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In such a conception, “man is treated as an instrument of production, 
whereas he—he alone, independently of the work he does—ought to 
be treated as the effective subject of work and its true maker and 
creator,”166 as well as “the true purpose of the whole process of 
production.”167
In the context of the relations between capital and labor in the 
process of production, John Paul II has no doubts about the priority 
of work: “labour is always a primary efficient cause, while capital, the 
whole collection of means of production, remains a mere instrument 
or instrumental cause.”168  Capital should be thought of as 
subordinate to labor, and “at the service of work.”169  Capital—however 
sophisticated and technologically advanced—should be thought of 
only as a “workbench.”170  Its worth and value have their roots in the 
service it renders to work.  Furthermore, work is prior to the 
workbench that is capital and partially responsible for its existence.  
Capital, in fact, is the result of two inheritances: 
the inheritance of what is given to the whole of humanity in the 
resources of nature, and the inheritance of what others have 
already developed on the basis of those resources, primarily by 
developing technology, that is to say, by producing a whole 
collection of increasingly perfect instruments for work.  In 
working, man also “enters into the labour of others.”171
C. Social Organization: Subsidiarity and Solidarity 
The classic principle of Catholic social doctrine known as the 
principle of subsidiarity172 grows out of the recognition that  
the social nature of man is not completely fulfilled in the State, 
but is realized in various intermediary groups, beginning with the 
family and including economic, social, political and cultural 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. ¶ 12. 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. ¶ 14. 
 171 Laborem Exercens, supra note 9, ¶ 13. 
 172 The principle has deep roots in Catholic social thought, going back at least to 
Thomas Aquinas, but it was given special prominence by Pius XI.  See Encyclical 
Letter from Pope Pius XI to the Bishops of the Catholic Church, Quadragesimo 
Anno [The Fortieth Year] (May 15, 1931), available at http://www.vatican.va/ 
holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_19310515_quadragesimo-a 
nno_en.html. 
COVERDALE FINAL.DOC 10/9/2005  8:56:40 AM 
36 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1 
 
groups which stem from human nature itself and have their own 
autonomy, always with a view to the common good.173   
In light of this conviction, subsidiarity teaches that a larger, higher-
level organism should not do what smaller, lower-level organisms can 
accomplish, either on its own or with assistance from the higher-level 
organism. 
In John Paul II’s thought—as indeed in Catholic social thought 
generally—subsidiarity is not merely a question of finding the most 
efficient level at which to place particular functions.  It reflects the 
larger vision of human beings as free and responsible persons created 
by God “for their own sake” and yet called to live in relation with 
others and to achieve their fulfillment precisely in making a free gift 
of themselves to others.174
John Paul II considers the ideal social organization one in which 
there is ample room for “the spirit of initiative” or what he calls 
“creative subjectivity.”175  Individuals and smaller social entities should 
not only be permitted to carry out the functions they are capable of 
performing, but should be encouraged and helped to do so by larger 
entities.  Higher-level entities, he says, should ascribe to themselves 
only those functions which lower-level entities cannot carry out, even 
with assistance: 
[S]maller social units—whether nations themselves, communities, 
ethnic or religious groups, families or individuals—must not be 
namelessly absorbed into a greater conglomeration, thus losing 
their identity and having their prerogatives usurped.  Rather, the 
proper autonomy of each social class and organization, each in its 
own sphere, must be defended and upheld.176
Subsidiarity cannot be adequately understood in isolation from 
the principle of solidarity.  Solidarity springs from recognizing the 
 173 Centesimus Annus, supra note 15, ¶ 13.   The summer 2005 issue of the Journal 
of Catholic Social Thought was entirely dedicated to subsidiarity.  Journal of Catholic 
Social Thought, Table of Contents Summer 2005, http://www3.villanova.edu/missio 
n/journal/contents/05s.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2005).  See also Robert K. Vischer, 
Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance: Beyond Devolution, 35 IND. L. REV. 103 (2001). 
 174 See supra notes 94–108 and accompanying text. 
 175 Encyclical Letter from Pope John Paul II to the Bishops of the Catholic 
Church, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis [On Social Concern] ¶ 15 (Dec. 30, 1987), available 
at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_ 
enc_30121987_sollicitudo-rei-socialis_en.html [hereinafter Sollicitudo Rei Socialis]. 
 176 Message to Academy of Social Sciences, supra note 48. 
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other members of society as persons.177  Its “essential note . . . is to be 
found in the radical equality of all men and women,”178 and it  
helps us to see the ‘other’ . . . not just as some kind of instrument, 
with a work capacity and physical strength to be exploited at low 
cost and then discarded when no longer useful, but as our 
‘neighbor,’ a ‘helper,’ to be made a sharer, on a par with 
ourselves, in the banquet of life to which all are equally invited by 
God.179
Solidarity, John Paul II insists, 
is not a feeling of vague compassion or shallow distress at the 
misfortunes of so many people, both near and far.  On the 
contrary, it is a firm and persevering determination to commit 
oneself to the common good; that is to say to the good of all and 
of each individual, because we are all really responsible for all.180
Solidarity grows out of a recognition that “we are brothers and sisters in 
a common humanity.”181  In addition, in the light of Christian faith, 
solidarity seeks to go beyond itself, to take on the specifically 
Christian dimension of total gratuity, forgiveness and 
reconciliation.  One’s neighbor is then not only a human being 
with his or her own rights and a fundamental equality with 
everyone else, but becomes the living image of God the Father, 
redeemed by the blood of Jesus Christ and placed under the 
permanent action of the Holy Spirit.  One’s neighbor must 
therefore be loved, even if an enemy, with the same love with 
which the Lord loves him or her; and for that person’s sake one 
must be ready for sacrifice, even the ultimate one: to lay down 
one’s life for the brethren.182
D. Economic Organization: Freedom at the Service of Persons 
John Paul II’s teaching on questions of economic organization 
reflects his stress on the subjective value of work, his emphasis on the 
value and dignity of persons and their freedom, and his commitment 
to the principle of subsidiarity.  He eschews both collectivist solutions 
 177 See Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, supra note 175, ¶ 39. 
 178 Pope John Paul II, Message for XX World Day for Peace ¶ 4 (Jan. 1, 1987), 
available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/messages/peace/docu 
ments/hf_jp-ii_mes_19861208_xx-world-day-for-peace_en.html [hereinafter World 
Day for Peace 1987]. 
 179 Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, supra note 175, ¶ 39 (internal citation omitted) (quoting 
Genesis 2:18–20). 
 180 Id. ¶ 38. 
 181 World Day for Peace 1987, supra note 178, ¶ 2. 
 182 Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, supra note 175, ¶ 40 (internal citation omitted) (citing 1 
John 3:16). 
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which stifle initiative under centralized controls and libertarian 
capitalist solutions which leave unanswered basic human needs that 
are not backed by purchasing power. 
John Paul II recognizes that free markets are efficient devices for 
allocating resources: “[T]he free market is the most efficient 
instrument for utilizing resources and effectively responding to needs 
. . . which are ‘solvent,’ insofar as they are endowed with purchasing 
power, and for those resources which are ‘marketable,’ insofar as they 
are capable of obtaining a satisfactory price.”183  In his view, the value 
of markets does not lie, however, only in their ability to allocate 
resources effectively.  They are also desirable because “they give 
central place to the person’s desires and preferences, which, in a 
contract, meet the desires and preferences of another person.”184
Despite his appreciation of markets, John Paul II sees a need for 
governmental activity in the economic sphere in order to promote 
social justice.  Markets do an excellent job of responding to needs 
that are backed by purchasing power, but a just society cannot limit 
itself to meeting those needs: 
[T]here are many human needs which find no place on the 
market.  It is a strict duty of justice and truth not to allow 
fundamental human needs to remain unsatisfied, and not to allow 
those burdened by such needs to perish. . . .  Even prior to the 
logic of a fair exchange of goods and the forms of justice 
appropriate to it, there exists something which is due to man because 
he is man, by reason of his lofty dignity.  Inseparable from that 
required “something” is the possibility to survive and, at the same 
time, to make an active contribution to the common good of 
humanity.185
In some cases, private individuals or groups (including unions, 
which John Paul II specifically mentions in this context),186 or local 
 183 Centesimus Annus, supra note 15, ¶ 34 (emphasis omitted). 
 184 Id. ¶ 40. 
 185 Id. ¶ 34. 
 186 Id. ¶ 35.  The right of workers to unionize and the obligations of organized 
workers have bulked large in Catholic Social Teaching from its inception in Leo 
XIII’s encyclical Rerum Novarum.  Encyclical Letter from Pope Leo XIII to the 
Bishops of the Catholic Church, Rerum Novarum [On Capital and Labor] (May 15, 
1891), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/encyclicals/docume 
nts/hf_l-xiii_enc_15051891_rerum-novarum_en.html.  John Paul II stands squarely 
in this tradition.  See, e.g., Laborem Exercens, supra note 9, ¶ 20.  Given the constraints 
on the size of this Article, I have not developed this aspect of John Paul II’s thought, 
not because it is unimportant, but because there are fewer fresh new approaches 
here than in other areas of his thought.  Cf. David L. Gregory, Catholic Social Teaching 
on Work, 49 LAB. L.J. 912 (1998). 
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governments can meet needs markets cannot.  John Paul II asserts, 
however, that some degree of intervention by national governments 
will often be required if “the market [is to] be appropriately 
controlled . . . so as to guarantee that the basic needs of the whole of 
society are satisfied.”187  Although economic freedom is a value, it 
must be “circumscribed within a strong juridical framework which 
places it at the service of human freedom in its totality, and which 
sees it as a particular aspect of that freedom.”188
Not only can markets alone fail to meet the individual needs of 
all the members of the society, they are also often ill suited to 
protecting and fostering “collective and qualitative needs” such as 
protection of the environment.189  In John Paul II’s view: 
It is the task of the State to provide for the defence and 
preservation of common goods such as the natural and human 
environments, which cannot be safeguarded simply by market 
forces.  Just as in the time of primitive capitalism the State had the 
duty of defending the basic rights of workers, so now, with the 
new capitalism, the State and all of society have the duty of 
defending those collective goods which, among others, constitute the 
essential framework for the legitimate pursuit of personal goals 
on the part of each individual.190
John Paul II makes no attempt to prescribe specific solutions or 
to dictate the amount of governmental control of the economy.  He 
recognizes that these are areas for prudential decisions based on 
specific circumstances.  Therefore no solution can claim to be “the 
Catholic solution.”191  He does, however, reject both the smothering 
intervention of the welfare state which “deprive[s] society of its 
responsibility . . . [and] leads to a loss of human energies,”192 and  the  
radical capitalistic ideology . . . which refuses even to consider 
the[] problems [of marginalization and exploitation in the Third 
World and of alienation in the developed world], in the a priori 
belief that any attempt to solve them is doomed to failure, and 
 187 Centesimus Annus, supra note 15, ¶ 35. 
 188 Id. ¶ 42. 
 189 Id. ¶ 40.  This is not to say that John Paul II rejects the use of market 
mechanisms—such as transferable pollution rights—in the pursuit of environmental 
goals.  I am not aware of his ever having addressed these types of mechanisms.  They 
generally function, however, within a governmentally established framework. 
 190 Id. 
 191 See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 192 Centesimus Annus, supra note 15, ¶ 48. 
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which blindly entrusts their solution to the free development of 
market forces.193
John Paul II sees government’s principal contribution to 
economic well being in providing “guarantees of individual freedom 
and private property, as well as a stable currency and efficient public 
services . . . so that those who work and produce can enjoy the fruits 
of their labours and thus feel encouraged to work efficiently and 
honestly.”194  Governments, however, must also be involved in 
“overseeing and directing the exercise of human rights in the 
economic sector,” although primary responsibility in this area falls to 
individuals and social groups.195  Further, governments need to 
“sustain business activities by creating conditions which will ensure 
job opportunities, by stimulating those activities where they are 
lacking or by supporting them in moments of crisis.”196  In addition to 
these roles of coordinating and stimulating business activities, 
governments may need to play a “substitute function” when the 
private sector is too weak or just getting under way, but John Paul II 
cautions that such interventions should be as brief as possible.197
E. Property and the Universal Destination of Goods 
Like his predecessors,198 John Paul II affirms the right to private 
property.  In part, this is because private property and free markets 
have proven to be particularly efficient ways of organizing economic 
activity.199  In the mind of John Paul II, however, private property is 
also an important component of human dignity and autonomy: 
A person who is deprived of something he can call “his own,” and 
of the possibility of earning a living through his own initiative, 
comes to depend on the social machine and on those who control 
it.  This makes it much more difficult for him to recognize his 
 193 Id. ¶ 42. 
 194 Id. ¶ 48. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. 
 197 Id. 
 198 See, e.g., Encyclical Letter from Pope Leo XIII to the Bishops of the Catholic 
Church, Rerum Novarum [On Capital and Labor] ¶ 8–13 (May 15, 1891), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_15 
051891_rerum-novarum_en.html; Encyclical Letter from Pope John XXIII to the 
Bishops of the Catholic Church, Mater et Magistra [On Christianity and Social 
Progress] ¶¶ 108–111 (May 15, 1961), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_fath 
er/john_xxiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-xxiii_enc_15051961_mater_en.html. 
 199 See supra notes 183–184 and accompanying text. 
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dignity as a person, and hinders progress towards the building up 
of an authentic human community.200
Nonetheless, private property, however important, is not in John 
Paul II’s view the primordial principle of social and economic 
organization.  Rather, he finds the “characteristic principle of 
Christian social doctrine”201 in “the universal destination of the earth’s 
goods,”202  i.e., in the fact that “the goods of this world are originally 
meant for all.”203  According to John Paul II, “God gave the earth to 
the whole human race for the sustenance of its members, without 
excluding or favouring anyone.”204
But the earth does not satisfy human needs without work, and it 
is through work that men adapt the earth to their needs and at the 
same time acquire title to that part of it that they have transformed.205  
Private property “is acquired first of all through work in order that it 
may serve work.”206  This acquisition of rights to individual property 
does not cancel out the principle of the universal destination of the 
goods of the earth.  A person who acquires private property through 
his work “has the responsibility not to hinder others from having 
their own part of God’s gift; indeed, he must cooperate with others so 
that together all can dominate the earth.”207
The universal destination of the goods of the earth profoundly 
affects the meaning and significance of property rights.  John Paul II 
conceives private property as subject to a “social mortgage.”208  By this 
he means that the right to property is not “absolute and 
untouchable.”209  Rather, it is “subordinated to the right to common use, to 
the fact that goods are meant for everyone.”210  Referring specifically 
to privately owned means of production, he says: 
Isolating these means as a separate property in order to set it up 
in the form of “capital” in opposition to “labour”—and even to 
 200 Centesimus Annus, supra note 15, ¶ 13. 
 201 Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, supra note 175, ¶ 42. 
 202 Centesimus Annus, supra note 15, ¶ 6 (emphasis added). 
 203 Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, supra note 175, ¶ 43. 
 204 Centesimus Annus, supra note 15, ¶ 31. 
 205 See id. 
 206 Laborem Exercens, supra note 9, ¶ 14. 
 207 Centesimus Annus, supra note 15, ¶ 31. 
 208 Pope John Paul II, Opening Address at the Puebla Conference ¶ III, 4 (Jan. 28, 
1979); Pope John Paul II, Message to the Jubilee 2000 Debt Campaign (Sept. 23, 
1999), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/speeches/ 
1999/september/documents/hf_jp-ii_mes_23091999_jubilee-2000-debt-campaign_ 
en.html. 
 209 Laborem Exercens, supra note 9, ¶ 14. 
 210 Id. 
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practise exploitation of labour—is contrary to the very nature of 
these means and their possession.  They cannot be possessed 
against labour, they cannot even be possessed for possession’s sake, 
because the only legitimate title to their possession—whether in 
the form of private ownership or in the form of public or 
collective ownership—is that they should serve labour, and thus, by 
serving labour, that they should make possible the achievement of 
the first principle of this order, namely, the universal destination 
of goods and the right to common use of them.211
The universal destination of the goods of the earth is 
incompatible with situations in which some people have vast 
possessions while others cannot meet even their elementary needs. 
John Paul II finds “one of the greatest injustices of the contemporary 
world” in “the poor distribution of the goods and services originally 
intended for all.”212
John Paul II’s concept of property differs sharply from the 
“programme of capitalism practised by liberalism and by the political 
systems inspired by it.”213  He rejects the position of “‘rigid’ capitalism 
. . . [which] defends the exclusive right to private ownership of the 
means of production as an untouchable ‘dogma’ of economic life.”214  
Not only does he believe that the universal destination of the goods 
of the earth brings with it limits on the rights and autonomy of 
privately owned capital, but he also believes that, under appropriate 
circumstances, the “socialization” of certain means of production may 
be called for.215
“Socialization,” does not mean simply expropriating formerly 
privately-held capital.  “[M]erely converting the means of production 
into State property in the collectivist system is by no means equivalent 
to ‘socializing’ that property.”216  The goal is not state ownership but 
rather a situation in which “on the basis of his work each person is 
fully entitled to consider himself a part-owner of the great workbench 
at which he is working with every one else.”217  John Paul II suggests 
that one way of moving toward that goal might be by 
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associating labour with the ownership of capital, as far as possible, 
and by producing a wide range of intermediate bodies with 
economic, social and cultural purposes; they would be bodies 
enjoying real autonomy with regard to the public powers, 
pursuing their specific aims in honest collaboration with each 
other and in subordination to the demands of the common good, 
and they would be living communities both in form and in 
substance, in the sense that the members of each body would be 
looked upon and treated as persons and encouraged to take an 
active part in the life of the body.218
III. CONCLUSION 
John Paul II offers a penetrating and remarkably coherent set of 
answers to the most fundamental questions lawyers face as persons, as 
professionals, and as citizens.  His vigorous defense of the dignity and 
value of every human life and his stress on the role of inter-personal 
relations in the development of each individual marks out a path 
between the two extremes which mar contemporary understandings 
of the human condition: collectivism, which sacrifices the person to 
the goals of the group, and individualism, which fails to recognize 
that individuals find their ultimate fulfillment not in isolation, but in 
service to others and to the common good—a good not only of the 
community, but of each person who contributes to it. 
John Paul II’s analysis of specific issues, such as work and the 
role of government in economic life, is rooted in his philosophical 
and theological anthropology.  He lays no claim to special expertise 
in economics or politics, but rather explores the implications for 
social and economic organization of his vision of what it means to be 
human.  His goal is to discover principles of social, political, and 
economic organization that will permit the men and women who 
make up society to achieve not only personal autonomy and 
economic prosperity but fulfillment as human beings. 
John Paul II addresses himself in many of his documents to all 
men and women of good will.219  His thought, however, has special 
relevance to lawyers, because all lawyers who aspire to go beyond 
being mere technicians must come to grips with the ultimate 
questions that concern the goal of human life and the sort of society 
that will contribute to its attainment.  It is my hope that this Article 
will inspire some readers to delve more deeply into John Paul II’s 
answers. 
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